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In Re Hilmer AND THE PARIS CONVENTION: AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT OF FOREIGN
PRIORITY FOR PATENTS OF INVENTION
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the United States government began pressuring foreign
countries to strengthen their patent laws. In many countries, U.S.
inventors cannot get the same patent protection that they get in the
United States.' Yet, at the same time, the United States' own pat-
ent laws discriminate against foreigners.' This comment concerns
one of the discriminations against foreigners, the discrimination
against foreign patent applications as prior art' which was affirmed
in the case of In re Hilmer4 The comment concludes that the
Hilmer rule violates U.S. obligations under the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property (hereinafter Paris Conven-
tion) 5 and should therefore be changed.
Under the U.S. patent law, an application for U.S. Letters Pat-
ent must first be examined' by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
1. Wall Street Journal April 3, 1986, p.6, col. 3. Address by Ambassador Clayton
Yeutter, Annual Meeting of the Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass'n (Oct. 9, 1986), published in Am.
Intell. Prop. L. Ass'n Bull. Sept.-Oct. 1986 p.3 0 4 .
2. Donald S. Chisum, Foreign Activity, Its Effect on Patentability under United
States Law, 11 IIC 26 (Int'l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. 1980). Karl F. Jorda, That
Discriminatory U.S. Patent Law, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 95 (1978).
3. See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
4. 359 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1966). The rule was adopted at least as early as 1938 in
Viviani v. Taylor v. Herzog, 72 U.S.P.Q. 448 (Comm'r Pat. 1938). However, it has attracted
the most attention since In re Hilmer. See Note, Patents-Patentability-Effective Prior Art-
Date of an United States Patent as of the Foreign Filing Date-Conflicting Decisions, 16 AM.
UL. REV. 335 (1967); Recent Developments, Patent Law-Prior Foreign Filing Date of a
United States Patent not effective for Purposes of Reference, 13 HOWARD L.J. 2109 (1967);
Recent Decisions, Patents-Rule 131 Affidavits-Foreign Priority Date not the Effective Date
of Patents as a Reference-In re Hilmer, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 137 (1966). For a general
description of the rules involved see Recent Decisions, U.S. Application by Foreign Inventor-
Unclaimed Disclosures in Foreign Application Good as "Prior Art" Only From the Date of
U.S. Filing, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485 (1977); Ernest F. Marmorek, Some Problems
in the U.S. Patent Practice Concerning the International Priority, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 670
(1973); R.B. Brody, U.S. Treaty Law, The Paris Convention, and 35 U.S.C. § 119, 53 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 194-200, 256-64 (1971).
5. March 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, T.S. 379, 1 Bevan 80. The latest revision was in
Stockholm July 14, 1967, .21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. 6923. For a general background see
Friedrich-Karl Beier, One Hundred Years of International Cooperation-the Role of the
Paris Convention Past, Present and Future, 15 IIC I (Int'l Rev. Ind. Prop. & Copyright L.
1984).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 131.
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fice (PTO). 7 Part of the examination consists of comparing the in-
vention claimed8 in the patent application to the prior art, the state
of the art before the applicant made his invention. The prior art
consists of publications, patents, and U.S. patent applications.9 To
pass the examination, the claimed invention must be, among other
things, "novel" 10 and "nonobvious"" in light of the prior art. Oth-
erwise, the invention will be rejected. The prior art is therefore tre-
mendously important to a patent applicant. One similar patent ap-
plication, when admitted into the prior art, can mean the difference
between rejection and allowance. 2 Accordingly, the rules for what
qualifies as prior art must be very precise. The Hilmer rule is one
such rule.
Consider the following scenario:
January 1. Ruritanian inventor R files a patent application in
Ruritania.1 a
February 1. U.S. inventor U files a similar patent application in
the U.S. 14
7. 35 U.S.C. § 1.
8. A patent application consists of a specification, drawings, and an oath of inventor-
ship, 35 U.S.C. § I II. The specification is a written description of the invention which con-
cludes with one or more claims. The claims must particularly point out the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 102 lists the following items as belonging to the prior art:
-More than one year prior to when the applicant made his invention: (1) a patent or
printed, published description of an invention in any country and (2) any public use or sale
of an invention in the U.S. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
Before the applicant made his invention: (1) invention of the same thing by another, 35
U.S.C. § 102(g), (2) knowledge or use of the invention in this country by others, (3) a
description of the invention in a printed publication anywhere, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), and (4) a
description of an invention in a granted patent filed in the U.S. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). A patent
application functions as prior art starting on the day it is filed, not on the day it is allowed,
even though it is kept secret until that day. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville
Co., 270 U.S. 390, 46 S. Ct. 324, 70 L. Ed. 651 (1926).
10. Novelty is defined in terms of the prior art. Anything which does not appear in
the prior art is novel. 35 U.S.C. § 102. See supra note 9.
11. Obviousness is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 103.
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
12. If the issue is novelty, the examiner decides whether the invention is described in
the prior art. One earlier application that describes the invention, or claims the invention, if
it qualifies as prior art, can bar the later application. If the issue is obviousness, the examiner
considers several prior art references which together render the invention obvious. However,
removing one of these references from the prior art can destroy the combination that creates
the obviousness.
13. Ruritania is used as a variable through this comment. The name refers to any
country except the one under discussion but to no country in particular.
14. It is assumed that U and R made their inventions independently and applied for
patents in good faith.
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March 1. Ruritanian inventor R files a patent application in the
U.S. for the same invention claimed in his Ruritanian patent
application.
If U's invention is similar to, or the same as R's invention and
both seek U.S. patents, then it is crucial to know whether their
applications qualify as prior art against each other. 15 U.S. law an-
swers the prior art questions as follows: First, as to U's application,
neither of R's applications are prior art against U's application. Ac-
cording to In re Hilmer, a patent application becomes prior art as
of the date it is filed in the United States PTO. For R this is March
1, one month after U filed his application.1 U's application pre-
cedes R's.
Second, regarding R's U.S. application, U's application is not
prior art against it. Both the Paris Convention's Article 417 and 35
U.S.C. section 119, which enables the Paris Convention, 8 guaran-
tee priority to R's application as of January 1, the date it was filed
in Ruritania, one month before U filed his application. R's applica-
tion precedes U's. The result is that both applications precede the
other and are insulated from any rejections based on the other.
15. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
16. The situation in Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859 was slightly more complex than the hypo-
thetical with R hnd U:
Jan. 24, 1957 Habicht's Swiss filing.
Jul. 31, 1957 Hilmer's German filing.
Jan. 23, 1958 Habicht's U.S. filing.
Jul. 25, 1958 Hilmer's U.S. filing.
The Court concluded that Hilmer was entitled to a patent because his German filing date
preceded Habicht's U.S. filing date. The validity of Habicht's patent was not at issue, but
applying the same rule, Habicht would be entitled to a patent too. His Swiss filing preceded
Hilmer's U.S. filing.
Eli Lilly Co. v. Brenner, 375 F.2d 599, 126 U.S. App. D.C. 171 (D.C. Cir. 1967), followed
the Hilmer rule. The facts of Lilly resemble the hypothetical of R and U more closely
Sept. 24, 1959 Feather's British filing.
July 19, 1960 Rapala's reduction to practice in U.S.
Sept. 19 1960 Feather's U.S. filing.
July 27, 1961 Rapala's U.S. filing.
Rapala's reduction to practice allowed him to show priority over Feather's U.S. filing. 35
U.S.C. § 102(g). The Court of Appeals, following Hilmer, concluded that Rapala was enti-
tled to a patent notwithstanding Feather's British filing date. The validity of Feather's patent
was not at issue.
17. See infra notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text.
18. An application for a patent for an invention filed in this country by any
person who has . . . previously regularly filed an application for a patent for the
same invention in a foreign country which affords similar privileges in the case of
applications filed in the United States . . . shall have the same effect as the applica-
tion would have if filed in this country on the date on which the application for the
same invention was first filed in such foreign country ..
35 U.S.C. § 119.
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This is a problem because, contrary to the basic policy of the
patent laws,19 it is possible for two patents to be granted for the
same invention. If R and U apply for U.S. patents for the same
invention, in reality, only one application can be novel. The other
application must be anticipated by the one that precedes it. Yet,
under the rules described above, both applications are considered
novel, and both will be granted.
Similarly, if R and U apply for U.S. patents, and their applica-
tions, together with other prior art, render each other's inventions
obvious, only one application can be nonobvious. The other applica-
tion must be rendered obvious by the one that preceded it. Yet the
same rules apply. Both applications were first. Both applications are
granted.
The U.S. law responds to the problem of issuing similar patents
with the interference proceeding. If the two patent applications
claim substantially identical subject matter and scope, then the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks declares an interfer-
ence, 20 a proceeding to determine the first inventor of the conflict-
ing claims.2' However, the interference can be avoided by changing
the claims and manipulating the procedural rules.22 In addition, the
19. Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 197, 14 S. Ct. 310, 38 L. Ed 121 (1893).
Radio Corp. v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 3, 55 S. Ct. 928, 79 L. Ed
163 (1934).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 135.
21. Interference practice is intended to protect the first inventor from the first one to
file a patent application. It was originally thought that large corporations with their large
budgets would usually be the quickest to file patent applications, depriving the first inventor
of his intrinsic rights. The interference was the small inventor's remedy. Donald R. Dunner,
First-to-File: Should Our Interference System be Abolished, 68 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 561
(1986).
Unfortunately, interference practice is expensive, risky and often unsatisfying. Robert A.
Armitage, Reform of the Law on Interference: A New Role for an Ancient Institution in the
Context of a First-to-File System, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 663, 665-66 (1983). The average
interference lasts over two years, Calvert & Sofocleous, Interference Statistics for Fiscal
Years 1983 to 1985, 68 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 385 (1986); Calvert & Sofocleous, Three Years
of Interference Statistics, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 699 (1983); De Simone, Gambrell &
Gareau, Characteristics of Interference Practice, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 503 (1963). One now
famous case lasted 13 years and two months before it was finally resolved in Standard Oil
Co. v. Montedison S.pA., 664 F.2d 345, 212 U.S.P.Q. 327, cert. den., 215 U.S.P.Q. 95
(1982). For a fully contested interference, attorney fees alone cost hundreds of thousands of
dollars. Armitage, supra, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y at 667.
Recently, the American Intellectual Property Law Association surveyed a portion of its
members. Attorneys have a vested interest in complicated, expensive, proceedings because
they generate large fees, yet 79% of those surveyed agreed that "interferences do not serve
the interests of small inventors, universities, and non profit research organization because of
the cost, delay, and uncertainty associated with contesting priority." Only 38% felt that pat-
ents should be granted to the first to invent rather than the first to file despite any weak-
nesses in the present system. Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass'n Bulletin Jan.-Feb. 1987 p. 27.
22. Between R and U, U is the likely winner. R cannot use any acts that occurred in
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legal standard for interference is different from the standards for
novelty and obviousness. So, even if the interference is resolved, the
claimed inventions may still lack novelty or nonobviousness in light
of each other. Either R or U may still receive a patent to which he
is not entitled. Worse yet, it may be practically impossible to work
either patent without infringing2" the other. Neither R nor U have
received the exclusivity that the patent laws are supposed to
bestow. 4
The problem is caused by the conflict between the Hilmer rule,
which gives priority to U, and the Paris Convention, which gives
priority to R. This Comment will show that the Hilmer rule vio-
lates the Paris Convention and should be discarded. Without the
Hilmer rule, R's application would be prior art as of its Ruritanian
filing date. Unless U could show that he was the first inventor,2 5 R,
who applied first, should receive his patent free of U's claims. With
the Hilmer rule, R either shares his patent with U,2 6 or loses his
Ruritania to show priority except his Ruritanian filing, January i. 35 U.S.C. § 104. On the
other hand, for U to win, he must have evidence that he conceived the invention or reduced it
to practice before R's Ruritanian filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). This may be impossible
because U's evidence must be corroborated. Rieser v. Williams, 255 F.2d 419, 424 (C.C.P.A.
1958).
Given the uncertainty, delay and expense of the interference, U and R will probably try to
limit the proceeding as much as possible by manipulating their pleadings and settling. Ab-
sent the interference, both are entitled to patents. So an inventor will vigorously pursue an
interference only if he knows, when the interference is declared, that the additional protec-
tion that will be granted the winner is worth the risk, delay and expense. Such a situation is
rare. Finally even when claims do interfere, the Commissioner will not normally declare an
interference when the application filing dates are more than six months apart. Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure § 2903.
The patent laws acknowledge that interfering patents are sometimes granted. The owner
of an interfering patent has a civil cause of action against the owners of other interfering
patents. 35 U.S.C. § 291. See e.g., Bell Telephone Labs., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 564
F.2d 654 (3d Cir. 1977).
23. Whoever makes, uses or sells a patented invention in the U.S. without authoriza-
tion from the patent owner infringes the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271.
24. This is more of a problem for licensees than for patent owners. Patent rights may
be licensed or assigned. 35 U.S.C. § 261. Typically, a licensee will be authorized to sell or
use the invention in exchange for a royalty paid periodically in proportion to the amount sold
or amount of use. Licensees may be forced, on the threat of an infringement suit, to pay
royalties to both R and U. A licensee can, in good faith, purchase rights to work a patent
and invest his capital to do so, only to find that there is another patent covering the inven-
tion. Because of the licensee's investment, the second patent owner is in a superior bargain-
ing position and can demand exorbitant royalties. American patents only protect against
infringement within the United States, 35 U.S.C. § 271, so the injured licensees will all be
American operations. Regardless of benefits to American inventors, allowing two patents for
the same invention hurts American licensees. See e.g., Xerox Corp. v. Nashua Corp. 314 F.
Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y 1970).
25. During examination, this can be done with an affidavit "swearing back" of the file
date. It can also be done during an interference. See supra note 21 & 22 and accompanying
text.
26. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
1988]
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rights entirely.
This Comment uses two different methods of treaty interpreta-
tion to show Article 4's true meaning. The meanings arrived at will
then be applied to the Hilmer rule. First, the Convention's plain
and ordinary meaning will be applied and second, the practice of
the parties in applying the Convention will be compared. Finally,
several methods of correcting the U.S. law are mentioned.
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 4
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
grew out of a movement in the late 1800's to unify patent laws. 8
The movement culminated in 1880 at a conference of eighteen na-
tions. 9 While the conferees failed to draft a uniform patent law,
they did create an important treaty. The Paris Convention guaran-
tees specific rights to industrial property owners both nationally and
between nations.30 One of these is the right of priority of Article 4,
which reads in pertinent part:
Any one who shall have regularly deposited an application for a
patent of invention . . . in one of the contracting States, shall
enjoy for the purpose of making the deposit in the other States, a
right of priority [for six months after the original deposit]"1
In consequence, the deposit subsequently made in one of the other
States of the Union" before the expiration of this period [of six
months] cannot be invalidated by acts performed in the interval,
especially by another deposit [of a patent application] ....
This Comment proves an interpretation of this clause and applies
it to the Hilmer rule. In doing this two rules of interpretation are
used, both of which were accepted before 1883, the year that the
Paris Convention was presented. This ensures that the interpreta-
tion proven here could have been anticipated even by the original
draftsmen more than 100 years ago.
27. See supra note 22.
28. S. P. LADAS. PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND IN-
TERNATIONAL PROTECTION 59-63 (1975).
29. Austria-Hungary, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, France, Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Sal-
vador, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
30. LADAS, supra note 28, at 63-67.
31. The interval was seven months for countries separated by the oceans. In 1911, the
interval was changed to twelve months. Paris Convention, June 2, 1911, 1 Bev. 791, T.S.
579, 38 Stat. 1645.
32. The Paris Convention establishes a Union composed of the signatory States. Paris
Convention, supra note 6 at art. 1.
[Vol. 18
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A. Plain Meaning
The primary rule of treaty interpretation is to adopt the treaty's
plain and ordinary meaning. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties [hereinafter Vienna convention],33 provides: "A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in light of its object and purpose." 84
The plain meaning rule was not invented for the Vienna Conven-
tion. In 1758, Emer de Vattel in his treatise, The Law of Nations
or The Principles of Natural Law, wrote:
The first general rule of interpretation is that it is not permissible
to interpret what has no need of interpretation. When a deed is
worded in clear and precise terms, when its meaning is evident
and leads to no absurdity, there is no ground for refusing to ac-
cept the meaning which the deed naturally presents (emphasis in
text) .5
The works of William Edward Hall (when the language of a
treaty, taken in the ordinary meaning of the words, yields a plain
and reasonable sense, it must be taken as intended to be read in
that sense),36 and Samuel B. Crandall (the words of a treaty are to
be taken as used with their plain and natural meaning)37 echo this
view. The rule is also supported by intuition. If anything, a treaty
should mean what it says.
Recall the two inventors R and U."8 R regularly deposited a pat-
ent application. According to the Paris Convention, he is to enjoy a
right of priority during the interval between his Ruritanian and
U.S. patent application deposits. His priority interval lasts six
months. 9 U then deposited an application during R's priority inter-
val. The Paris Convention says that R's application "shall not be
invalidated" because of U's deposit. What actually happens under
the Hilmer rule is that R loses his exclusive rights. In fact, if there
33. 63 A.J.I.L. 875 (1969) May 22, 1969. While the U.S. is not a party to the Vi-
enna Convention, over 35 other nations are. The Convention is cited here as much for its
simple, logical structure as for its authority.
34. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, at art. 31(1).
35. E. DE VATTEL, II THE LAW OF NATIONS, ch. 17, § 263 (C.G. Fenwick trans.
1758 ed.).
36. W.E. Hall, II A Treatise on International Law, ch. 10, § I11 (1) (4th ed. 1895).
37. S. B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT § 171 (2d ed.
1916).
38. See supra notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text.
39. The interval was later extended. See supra note 31.
19881
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is an interference R may lose all his rights.'0
Does this mean that R's application invalidates U's application?
Strictly speaking, it does not. R is still entitled to a patent. How-
ever, R's application for exclusive control over his invention, the
most important of all patent rights, has been invalidated.
These answers suggest two possible "plain and natural" mean-
ings for Article 4. The Hilmer rule takes the plain and natural
meaning of Article 4 to be that applications shall not be invalidated
by acts performed in the interval, but anything less than completely
invalidating the application is permissible. On the other hand, if R
could use his foreign filing date for prior art purposes, the plain and
natural meaning of Article 4 would be that applications shall not be
invalidated nor substantially deprived of their effect by acts that
occur in the interval.
The second "plain and natural meaning" is clearly the most plain
and natural. Unfortunately, the Paris Convention does not abso-
lutely mandate this interpretation. It does not define invalidation,
priority or even patent.
B. Subsequent Practice
A secondary rule of treaty interpretation is to apply the subse-
quent practice of the parties who signed the treaty. In the words of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: "There shall be
taken into account, together with the context . . . any subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which established the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."' 1
This rule dates back to the turn of the century as well. Crandall
writes that "a practical and common construction of the terms of a
treaty by the parties . . . shortly after its conclusion is quite con-
clusive as to their meaning." '42
In this case the parties applied and construed the Paris Conven-
tion by changing their patent laws. By 1900, shortly after the Con-
vention was completed, twelve jurisdictions had changed their pat-
ent laws to conform to the Paris Convention.4"
40. See supra text accompanying notes 26 and 27.
41. Vienna Convention, supra note 33, at art. 31(3)(b).
42. Crandall, supra note 37, at § 167.
43. The following jurisdictions signed the Convention before 1900: Great Britain,
New Zealand, Queensland, New South Wales, Tasmania, Western Australia, Brazil, Den-
mark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Malta, Belgium, Dominican Republic,
France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Tunisia, and the United States. Only the first 12 enacted
enabling legislation by 1900. A. I. GREELEY, FOREIGN PATENT AND TRADEMARK LAWS § 68
[Vol. 18
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This Comment analyzes the laws adopted by every one of these
twelve jurisdictions plus France which applied the Convention with-
out enabling legislation. The patent laws are analyzed to determine
whether any of the countries construed the Paris Convention as al-
lowing a rule of law like the Hilmer rule."" The countries which
changed their patent laws in 1900 or later, the year of the first
revision of the Paris Convention, are disregarded in order to sepa-
rate out other variables. Starting in 1900, many things may have
altered a nation's otherwise nonpolitical construction of the Paris
Convention, for example, political maneuvers at the 1900 confer-
ence to modify the Paris Convention, retaliations against other
Paris Union members, later treaties, and two world wars. Finally,
to show the modern trend, the rules of the European Patent Con-
vention and the Patent Cooperation Treaty,4 which have been
adopted by many of the original Paris Convention countries,4 are
discussed.
The hypothetical situation of R and U, used in applying the U.S.
law,47 is used throughout to apply the law of each country. For
each country, it is assumed that U is a national of the jurisdiction
under discussion and that R and U both seek patents there. For
simplicity, it is assumed that R and U seek patents for the same
invention.48 Ruritania represents any jurisdiction that has signed
(1899). The U.S. enacted enabling legislation in 1903. 32 Stat. 1225.
44. This comment is limited to explicit legislative acts because it is difficult or impos-
sible to determine what interpretation a government has given the Paris Convention when it
has not taken any explicit action. Such a government has most likely not considered the Paris
Convention at all. France is an exception because the courts decided and reported cases
which are directly on point. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
45. European Patent Convention, October 7, 1977, reprinted in 2K John P. Sinnot,
World Patent Law and Practice (Matthew Bender 1987). Patent Cooperation Treaty, June
19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, T.I.A.S. no. 8733.
46. Of the countries listed supra note 43, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Denmark,
Norway, Portugal, Malta, Dominican Republic, Spain, Tunisia, and the U.S have not joined
the EPC. On the same list, all but New Zealand, Portugal, Malta, Dominican Republic,
Italy, Spain and Tunisia have acceded to the PCT. The U.S. ratified the PCT but retains a
reservation under the treaty's Article 64(4).
47. See supra notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text.
48. The issue is what qualifies as prior art. Because the U.S. law uses the same prior
art rules for novelty as it does for obviousness, it does not matter which issue is chosen for
the hypothetical of R and U. Novelty is chosen because each of the 13 countries used prior
art to determine novelty. Obviousness goes to whether the claimed invention is inventive or
not. At the turn of the century, there was no international consensus on the standard for
inventiveness. Even in the U.S., there was confusion. Comparing the prior art rules used for
novelty gives a definite and certain result in each country simply from reading the statute.
The comment also ignores whether a country used the "prior claims" or "whole contents"
approach to examination. While the difference is vital to the effect of a prior art reference, it
is immaterial to the issue here, whether the reference qualifies as prior art in the first place.
Finally the comment ignores the possibility of interfering claims. It is assumed that patents
1988]
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and abides by the Paris Convention other than the one discussed.
Under U.S. law, both R and U obtained patents even though R
applied first. If U cannot be entitled to a patent under the law of
the other thirteen countries to be discussed, then R's Article 4 pri-
ority has defeated U's application. In such a country, the Hilmer
rule would not be possible.
1. Brazil-Brazil was the first to amend its patent legislation to
accord with the Paris Convention. Brazil's Law of October 14,
1882 grants patents to inventions that have absolute novelty."9 The
patent guarantees exclusive use of the invention to the patentee."
Article II, section 1 enacts the Paris Convention. It provides, in
pertinent part:
The priority of right of property of an inventor who, having solic-
ited a patent in a foreign country, shall make a similar petition to
the imperial government within seven months, will not be invali-
dated by facts which may occur during this period-such as an-
other similar petition, the publication of the invention and its use
or employment.51
This is the same wording as the Paris Convention's Article 4
made into a statute, with one exception. Rather than insulating the
application from acts that occur in the interval, the Brazilians insu-
lated the priority right from acts that occur in the interval. Once
priority is established, it cannot be taken away by a later applicant.
Article V, section 2 states that, "The patent shall be null . . . If
the patentee did not have priority." Priority, therefore, determines
patentability.
Applying Brazil's law to the case of R and U, where U is Brazil-
ian, shows that the Hilmer rule is not possible. When R files his
application of January 1, he obtains priority under Article II, sec-
tion 1. U can do nothing to displace this priority. But, even if U
does somehow obtain a patent, Article V, section 1 nullifies U's
patent.
with interfering claims are granted on occasion. See supra note 22. Rather than adjusting
the hypothetical for each jurisdiction, it is simply assumed that the filing dates are as given
and that a priority dispute exists in which novelty is the issue.
49. Absolute novelty means that the invention may not be known, used, or described
in a publication anywhere in the world. Brazil Law of October 14, 1882, art. 1, § I.
50. Id., art. 1, preamble.
51. The translation is from B. V. ABBOT, THE PATENT LAWS OF ALL NATIONS, 51(1886).
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2. United Kingdom of Great Britain-Great Britain first ena-
bled the Paris Convention August 25, 1883.2 This law awarded
patents to the inventor with the earliest filing date. The Convention
was enacted through section 103, in pertinent part:
[A]ny person who has applied for protection for any invention [in
a foreign state which adheres to the Paris Convention] . . . shall
be entitled to a patent for his invention . . . under this Act, in
priority to other applicants; and such patent . . . shall have the
same date as the date of the protection obtained in such foreign
state.
Return to R and U. U is now a Briton filing under the British
Act of 1883. U has very little chance of gaining a patent. R, upon
filing in Britain in March would claim priority from the January
date of his Ruritanian filing. If the patent office did not deal with
the conflict, he could instigate an opposition to U's patent under
Section 11. It reads, in pertinent part:
Any person may at any time within two months from the date of
the advertisement of the acceptance of a complete specification
give notice at the patent office of opposition to the grant of the
patent . . . on the ground that the invention has been patented in
this country on an application of prior date ...
While both R and U may pass examination, only R, who has the
prior date, by virtue of section 103, will be granted a patent.
English case law supports this result also, but the first reported
cases on the issue did not appear until long after 1883. In both In
re Scherico" and In re Mono Containers Ltd., 4 patent claims were
defeated by patent applications with earlier foreign filing dates. In
both cases, the English Patent Appeals Tribunal, construing the
Patents Act of 1949 denied patents to English applicants who filed
during the foreign inventors' priority intervals.
3. Sweden-Sweden was next to enable the convention by
changing its patent laws. The Swedish law of May 16, 1884 5 is
remarkably clear and simple. Section 25 guarantees the right of
priority. In pertinent part:
[P]ersons, who within seven months from the date the [patent]
application was filed in the foreign state, apply for a patent for
52. 57 Vict. no. 57.
53. 1968 R.P.C. 407 (U.K. Pat. App. Trib. 1968).
54. 1970 R.P.C. 217 (U.K. Pat. App. Trib. 1970).
55. Abbot, supra note 51, at 536.
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the same invention in this country, shall with regard to earlier
applications for patents, be considered as if the application was
filed in this country at the same date as the application was filed
in the foreign state.
Section 9 of the Law explains the importance of the filing date:
When several persons desire to obtain a patent for the same or a
similar invention, the right of preference will be granted to the
inventor whose documents . . were earliest lodged with the pat-
ent authorities.
Returning to R and U, where U is now Swedish, R's application
will be treated as if it were lodged with the patent authorities on
January 1. This is earlier than any date that U can claim, so R is
granted the patent over U.
4. Queensland--Queensland enabled the Paris Convention Oc-
tober 13, 1884."6 Under the Act, the application filing date deter-
mines priority:
Every patent shall take effect and be expressed to take effect as of
the day of the application. . . . Provided . . . that in case of more
than one application for the same invention, the sealing of a pat-
ent 57 on one of those applications shall not prevent the sealing of
a patent on an earlier application. 58
In a priority dispute, only the earlier application is granted:
Any person may. . . give notice . . . of opposition to the grant
of a patent . . . on the ground that the invention has been pat-
ented in this colony on an application of prior date, or on the
ground . . . that the specification appears . . . to comprise the
same invention as is comprised in a specification bearing the same
or a similar title and accompanying a previous application. . ... ,
Section 80 enables the Paris Convention. In pertinent part:
[A]ny person who has applied for protection for any invention
. . . in a foreign State . . . shall be entitled to a patent for his
invention . . . under this Act in priority to other applicants, and
such patent . . shall take effect from the same date as the date
of the protection obtained in . . . such foreign State ...
Were U now of the colony of Queensland, then R, by virtue of
56. Id. at 447.
57. The sealing of the patent indicates that the patent is granted. The Patents, De-
signs, and Trade Marks Act, 1884, supra note 56 at § 19.
58. Id. at § 16.
59. Id. at § 14(1).
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Section 80, would have priority over applicants filing after his
Ruritanian filing date of January 1. R's Queensland patent would
take effect as of the same date. R could then oppose U's patent,
under Section 14(1), by showing that he had a patent before U
made his application, one month later, on February 1. The Hilmer
rule was not possible under the law of Queensland.
5. Norway-Norway responded to the Paris Convention on
June 16, 1885.60 In most cases, the Norwegian law grants the pat-
ent to the first to file:
The right to obtain a patent is available . . . to the first inventor
only. . . . In cases where it cannot be clearly ascertained who,
among several applicants for a patent for a given invention, is the
first inventor, the patent will be granted to the first one that
handed in an application.6
Section 33 enacts the Paris Convention:
If any one who shall have in a foreign country applied for a pat-
ent for an invention within a period of seven months after such
foreign application hands in an application for patent in this
country for the same invention, this last application shall . . . be
considered in relation to other applications as if it had been
handed in at the same time that the application was made in the
foreign state.
Were U now in Norway under the law of 1885, his application
would be rejected. R's application would be treated as if it were
"handed in" first, and the matter would be settled. If U were the
first inventor, he could still prevail, but that goes beyond the scope
of the Hilmer rule. In re Hilmer only concerned application dates,
not invention dates.
6. New Zealand-The New Zealand Act of 18892 grants pat-
ents to the first to file. If the patent office notices a conflict, it will
grant a patent only to the first to file.6" If an application has al-
ready been published, then the one seeking a conflicting patent
must file an opposition."'
Section 106 enacts the Paris Convention. It is virtually identical
60. Abbot, supra note 51, at 427.
61. Law of June 16, 1885, supra note 60, at § 3.
62. 53 Vict. no 12.
63. Id. § 10.
64. Id. § 15.
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to section 80 of the Queensland Act of 1884.68 As with the Queen-
sland Act, the law grants priority and effect as of the foreign filing
date. As in the case of Queensland, R could prevail over his New
Zealand opponent U, because R's New Zealand patent takes effect
retroactively, as of his Ruritanian filing date.
7. Tasmania-The Tasmanian Act of September 29, 189366
follows the Queensland and New Zealand Acts very closely. Sec-
tion 13 limits patents to the first filed application. Oppositions are
allowed by Section 19, and the Paris Convention is provided for by
Section 106. The Tasmanian Act of 1893 prevents the Hilmer rule
the same way that the Queensland and New Zealand Acts do.
8. Denmark-The Danish patent law of March 28, 1894, 67 op-
erates very much like the Swedish law for purposes of this discus-
sion. Section 3 guarantees patents to the first to file: "If several
persons apply for a patent for the same or substantially the same
invention, the person who has applied first shall have the preferen-
tial right to obtain the patent."
Section 28 provides for the Paris Convention:
[A]ny person who has lodged an application for a patent for an
invention in [a] foreign State, if he lodged an application for a
patent for the same invention in this country . . . the application
so lodged in this country shall, relatively to other applications, be
considered as made at the same time as the application in the
foreign State.
If U were now Danish, he could not challenge R's Danish patent
application. As in Sweden, R's Danish application is given the
Ruritanian filing date. R is, therefore, considered to have filed first
and, by virtue of section 3, R prevails.
9. Western Australia-Western Australia enacted the Paris
Convention October 10, 1894.68 The Act differs from those of
Queensland, New Zealand, and Tasmania in only one way. Rather
than providing that the foreign applicant's patent shall "take ef-
fect"69 on the foreign priority date, the Western Australian Act
provides that the foreign applicant's patent "shall have the same
65. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
66. 57 Vict. no. 6.
67. 1 Patent Laws of the World, 630 (1911) (Chartered Institute of Patent Agents).
68. 58 Vict. no. 4.
69. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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date" as its foreign counterpart. 7' As Western Australia's Law
grants patents to the first to file,7 ' this can serve only to strengthen
the argument that R's application prevails over U's.
10. Portugal-Portugal's law of December 15, 189472 provides
the patent to the first to file. Article 28 provides, in pertinent part:
The right to the grant of the privilege of invention belongs to the
first to present the application accompanied by the corresponding
documents to the Department of Industry. A person, however,
who has regularly made an application for a privilege of invention
in one of the countries allied with Portugal by a special conven-
tion on this subject shall enjoy the right of priority for a patent in
Portugal ...
Article 29 continues with, in pertinent part:
Whoever has obtained a patent of invention in a foreign county
allied to Portugal by a convention on this subject may, if he
makes a declaration to that effect, obtain an antedate for the pat-
ent, which shall be granted to him as of the date of the patent in
the country of origin.
I return to R and U, where U is now Portuguese, to show that
Portugal's law of 1894 did not allow a rule like the Hilmer rule. In
a dispute between R and U, the sole issue would be who shall be
considered the first to have presented his documents to the Depart-
ment of Industry. Initially, U, by his application of February 1,
would be the first. However, R, upon making a declaration in his
March 1 application, would obtain an antedate to January 1, his
foreign filing date. R would then be considered the first to file and
accordingly prevail.
11. New South Wales-The British Crown colony of New
South Wales responded to the Paris Convention with an Act on
December 10, 1897.11 It is, for the purposes of this comment, indis-
tinguishable from Western Australia's Act of November 26, 1888.
The same results apply.
12. Switzerland--Switzerland's first response to the Paris Con-
vention became effective November 15, 18887' The law authorized
70. 58 Vict. no 4, § 1.
71. 52 Vict. no. 5, § 10(5).
72. PATENT LAWS OF THE WORLD, supra note 67, vol. 2, at 315.
73. 61 Vict. no. 35.
74. 10 A.S. 764 (Switz. 1889).
1988]
15
Lindeen: In re Hilmer and the Paris Convention: An Interpretation of the R
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
patents for new and useful inventions 7 5 "new" meaning that the
invention was neither known nor previously in use in Switzerland.76
If it were found that a patent had issued for an invention which
was not new, then the patent lapsed. 77
Article 32 of the law covered the Convention priority right. It
allowed seven months between the foreign filing and the Swiss filing
during which no new developments, whether another patent appli-
cation or a publication could injure the validity of the patent.
Article 32 addresses the Hilmer issue directly. Under the Hilmer
rule, a patent application filed in the U.S. during the priority inter-
val can preempt a foreign filer's priority right. Article 32 expressly
prohibits patent applications filed during the priority interval from
affecting the foreign filer's priority right. Switzerland, in 1888, ex-
pressly rejected the Hilmer rule.
13. Japan-Japan's first enabling legislation for the Paris Con-
vention came into effect July 1, 1899.78 This law granted the patent
to the first inventor.79 In addition, when an application was first
filed in a Paris Convention country, the later Japanese application
had "the same validity as if it had been made on the date of the
first application."' 0
Unfortunately, the wording of the Act was not crystal clear. Ja-
pan went through many short lived patent acts around the turn of
the century and the uncertainties were never clearly resolved."
However, by at least 1974, Japan had resolved to give prior art
status to Japanese patent applications as of their foreign filing dates
and the Hilmer rule had been rejected in Japan.8 2
14. France-Under the French constitution, treaties have the
effect of law. No legislative action is required and none was made
before 1900.1" Scholars debated the meaning of Article 4 of the
Paris Convention but courts consistently preserved the rights of the
75. Id., Art. 1.
76. Id., Arts. 2 & 4.
77. Id., Art. 10(1).
78. The translation is from a pamphlet by W.A. DeHavilland, Law and Rules Relat-
ing to Copyright, Patents, and Trademarks, at p. 9 (1908).
79. Id. Art. 1.
80. Id., Art. 14.
81. Gadsby, The Progress of the Japanese Patent Law, 27 L.Q. REv. 60 (1911).
82. Reinhard Wieczorek, Convention Applications as Patent Defeating Prior Art, 6
IIC 135, 161-62 (1975).
83. Greeley, supra note 43.
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foreign filer." Originally, in a case between R and U, U being
French, the courts would have held U's patent invalid. It was de-
feated by R's Ruritanian filing. By 1914, courts were beginning to
consider U's application simply dormant. In other words, U's pat-
ent was ineffective so long as R's patent was valid, but if R's patent
lapsed, for whatever reason, U's patent immediately awoke to finish
its own term. Under either theory, R is protected from U. The
Hilmer rule is rejected.
C. The Common Construction as of 1899
Subsections 1-14 of the comment demonstrate that the Hilmer
rule violates Article 4 of the Paris Convention. Eight countries and
five British colonies responded to the 1883 draft of the Paris Con-
vention with enabling legislation. Every one of those jurisdictions
rejected the Hilmer rule result. Even France, with no enabling leg-
islation, rejected the rule.
D. Recent Developments
Since 1900, the European Patent Convention [hereinafter EPC]
and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)8" have been adopted.
Both treaties establish a patent examining procedure with rules for
prior art.86 These treaties do not enable the Paris Convention, they
go several steps beyond.8 7 They begin a uniform world patent law
much like the eighteen nation conference of 1883 unsuccessfully
tried to do more than 100 years ago.88
Both the European Patent Convention and the Patent Coopera-
tion Treaty, are first to file systems. The invention for which a pat-
ent application is filed may not have been disclosed in any publica-
tion or in a patent application with an earlier filing date.89 Any
foreign filing with a Paris Convention country establishes a filing
date indistinguishable from the filing date with the EPC or PCT
authorities. 90 Because the one filing date applies for all purposes,
there can be no Hilmer rule with either treaty.
As the industrialized world modifies its patent laws to coincide
84. Wieczorek, supra note 82, at 157-59.
85. See supra note 45.
86. EPC Art. 54. Pct. Art. 33(2) and Regulations rule 33.1.
87. Note, International Patent Cooperation: The Next Step, 16 CORNELL INT'L L.
J.229 (1983).
88. See supra note 28.
89. See supra note 86.
90. EPC supra note 45 Art. 88 & 89. PCT supra note 45 Art. 8.
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with the rules of the EPC and PCT,9  it continues to reject the
Hilmer rule. The construction of the other parties to the Paris Con-
vention, shortly after the Convention was drafted, and today has
been, and is now that the Hilmer rule violates that convention.
CONCLUSION
Two methods of interpretation have been applied to the Paris
Convention's Article 4. First, the plain meaning of the Convention
was examined. Second, the subsequent practice of the original par-
ties in adopting the Convention was examined. Both methods yield
the same result. The Hilmer rule, in addition to harming the U.S.'
own licensees92 and embarrassing U.S. efforts to eliminate discrimi-
nations in foreign patent laws, violates Article 4 of the Paris
Convention.
Fortunately, the problem can be solved. Both the courts and the
legislature can eliminate the rule. The courts need simply to extend
35 U.S.C. section 119 following the District Court opinion in Eli
Lilly Co. v. Brenner.93 However, this is unlikely. The decision in
Hilmer94 was based on a long standing PTO practice and an exten-
sive analysis of the legislative history.95 The Court had before it
some seven essays published in the Journal of the Patent Office So-
ciety discussing the merits of the domestic law on the point. 6 The
opinion was rendered by the Court of Customs and Patent appeals
which had some expertise in patent matters and the opinion itself
was written by Judge Giles Sutherland Rich, an expert in the field
and a participant in the drafting the 1952 Patent Act.97 Finally the
decision has been followed by a few other courts including the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.98
91. See e.g., Schonherr, Recent Changes in Patent and Trademark Law of Austria, 9
IIC 85 (Int'l Rev. Ind. Prop. & Copyr. L. 1978); Armitage, New British Patent Legislation,
9 IIC 207 (1978); Osterborg, Recent Changes in the Danish Patent Law, 10 IIC 314 (1979);
Vianes, New French Patent Law, 11 IIC 131 (1980); Kriegel, New German Patent Law, 13
IIC 1 (1982); Tornroth, Swedish Patent Legislation in Recent Years, 17 IIC 161 (1986).
92. See supra note 24.
93. 248 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1965).
94. See supra note 4.
95. 359 F.2d at 883.
96. 359 F.2d at 865-67.
97. Giles S. Rich, Thirty Years of this Judging Business, 14 Am. Intel. Prop. L
Ass'n Q.J. 140 (1986).
98. Eli Lilly Co. v. Brenner, 375 F.2d 599, 126 U.S. App. D.C. 171 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Tyler Refrigeration Corp. v. Kysor Indus. Corp., 601 F. Supp. 590, 599, 225 U.S.P.Q. 492
(D. Del. 1985); Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Dart Indus. Inc., 549 F. Supp. 716 (D.
Del. 1982).
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Nevertheless, it could be argued that the Paris Convention,
which was given short shrift by the Hilmer Court,9 9 demands a dif-
ferent result.100 The Hilmer rule relies on Congress' probable intent
in adopting 35 U.S.C. sections 102(e) and 119. If Congress in-
tended to enact the Paris Convention and not to violate it, then
Hilmer must be reconsidered. It should be assumed that Congress
intends to comply with treaties unless there is conclusive evidence
to the contrary. The Hilmer Court provided no such evidence. The
Court did not see the violation.
The problem could also be solved by legislation. Over the past
twenty years there have been many sweeping proposals to stream-
line the patent laws. Most of these proposals would abolish the
Hilmer rule.10' Recent proposals have focused on harmonizing the
patent laws of all nations, or at least as many as possible.' These
99. 359 F.2d at 872-73.
100. It would be difficult to invoke Article 4 directly as if it had the status of a statute
under U.S. Constitution art. VI cl. 2. This would require first, that the treaty be self-execut-
ing and second, that the treaty not be modified by a later act of Congress. Whitney v. Rob-
ertson, 124 U.S. 194, 8 S. Ct. 456, 31 L. Ed. 386 (1983).
It was assumed in 1913 that the Paris Convention is not self-executing. Cameron Septic
Tank Co. v. Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 33 S. Ct. 209, 57 L. Ed. 407 (1913) (This case also
summarizes previous decisions). There is little new evidence to show that the U.S. Supreme
Court should be reversed on this point.
The Paris Convention was finalized in 1883. The U.S. ratified it in 1887. Congress enabled
Article 4 as R.S. 4887 in 1903. The Milburn decision, see supra note 9, gave prior art status
to applications as of their filing dates in 1926. The Patent Office construed this to exclude
foreign applications by 1938. Viviani v. Taylor v. Herzog, 72 U.S.P.Q. 448 (1938). A new
patent act which retained R.S. 4887 and adopted most of these decisional rules was passed in
1952. Hilmer was decided in 1966 and was followed by Lilly 375 F.2d 599, 126 U.S. App.
D.C. Il1, March 29, 1967. The last revision to the Paris Convention was July 14, 1967 and
was ratified by the U.S. Senate shortly thereafter. Congress amended 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) to
put international applicants filing through the Patent Cooperation Treaty on the same status
as Paris Convention applicants in 1975. None of this is conclusive unless one argues that
Congress has considered the statutes and decisions and has not taken any definite action. The
wording of the statutes dating all the way back to 1903 is not crystal clear on the question
which arose in Viviani and in Hilmer.
101. For a general overview, see Mark T. Banner & John J. McDonnell, First-to-File,
Mandatory Re-examination, and Mandatory "Exceptional Circumstance": Ideas for Better?
Or Worse? 69 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 595 (1987). In 1967, a presidential commission released its
report. See e.g., Wm. R. Woodward, Changes in the Patent System Recommended by the
Presidential Commission, 27 Fed. B.J. 189 (1967); Charles F. Voytech, The Case for the
First-to-File Patent System, 54 A.B.A. J. 989 (Oct. 1968); George E. Frost, The 1967 Pat-
ent Law Debate-First-to-Invent vs. First-to-File, 1967 DUKE L.J. 923 (1967); First-to-File
System: Possibilities and Problems, 12 IDEA 944 (1968); Roy B. Moffit, Is First-to-File
System Constitutional?, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 754 (1968); Harry Goldsmith, Why Not a
First-to-File System?, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 699 (1967).
There were a number of bills presented to Congressional committees in the 1970's. See
Wieczorek, supra note 82 at 153-56.
Recent articles on the topic include Armitage, supra note 21, and Harold C. Wegner,
Patent Law Simplification and the Geneva Patent Convention, 14 Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass'n
Q.J. 154, 158-59 (1986).
102. See e.g., Comment, First to File vs. First to Invent, or Should We Also Change
19881
19
Lindeen: In re Hilmer and the Paris Convention: An Interpretation of the R
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
proposals are all very broad in scope with far reaching conse-
quences. Their merits will be left for others to discuss. The problem
could be solved immediately with a simple amendment to 35
U.S.C. § 102(e), the statute on which the Hilmer rule is based. The
amendment would simply make it clear that a qualifying foreign
filing determines the date that an application becomes prior art.103
While other countries may violate the Paris Convention in other
ways, 10 4 the United States is unique. The United States strives to
be a model for other countries to follow. It is proud of its legal
system and its prominence in science and technology. Surely, if the
United States is to erect roadblocks against foreigners, they should
not be erected to the detriment of its own licensees. No one wins
from this brand of protectionism. The mantle of hypocrisy should
be cast off immediately. Abolishing the Hilmer rule is a step in
that direction.
Gordon R. Lindeen III*
Mining Law, Water Law and Trademark Law? 69 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 167 (1987); Comment,
A "Re-examination" of "First-to-Invent," 69 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 289 (1987). On European
efforts, see e.g., Harmonization of Industrial Property and Copyright Law in the European
Community, 18 IIC 303 (Int'l Rev. Ind. Prop. & Copyr. L. 1987).
103. A possible amendment would be as follows:
Section 102
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(e) The invention was described in a patent granted in the United States on an application
for patent by another filed in the United States or in a foreign country before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent. [or on an international application by another who ful-
filled the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 371(c) of this title before
the invention thereof by the applicant for patent.]
The additions are underlined. Deletions are bracketed.
The additional phrase "in the United States" limits the prior art to applications which
have successfully qualified under section 119 or section 371. Any other foreign filings cannot
result in U.S. patents. The additional clause "or in a foreign country" grants the same status
to international applications as it does to foreign applications. International applications
must still be filed in some country. This change makes the deleted language unnecessary.
104. George R. Gansser, Violations of the Paris Convention for the Protection of In-
dustrial Property, 11 IIC I (Int'l Rev. Indus. Prop. L. 1980), 63 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 138
(1981). The U.S. also has roadblocks for U.S. inventors seeking patents abroad. Note, Pit-
falls of Foreign Patent Filing, 7 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 313, 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 415 (1976).
* Currently associated with the law firm of Christie Parker & Hale, Pasadena,
California.
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